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statement of “please consult
your own tax and financial
advisors ….”
It is well established that
the gain on the surrender of
a life insurance policy is
ordinary income to the
insured (Section 72(e))
unless specifically to a life
settlement company or other
purchaser from a
terminally-ill person. This
tax treatment is consistent
with the position that the
ordinary income is created
from the excess of the cash
surrender value over
premiums paid. Yet, life
settlement companies have
argued that a life insurance
policy is a capital asset in
the hands of one of its
investors; therefore, any
proceeds over the basis or
cost of the policy should be
capital gains.
The capital asset
argument has merit on two
counts. First, the life
insurance policy itself is a
capital asset under Section
1221 of the Internal
Revenue Code. That section
defines everything which is
not a capital asset (stock in
trade, property held for sale
to customers, etc.). Since life
insurance policies are not
listed, they can be
considered capital assets.
Sales of capital assets
generate capital gains,
either short-term or longterm, but capital gains
nonetheless.
The second case for
labeling the proceeds less
basis as a capital gain is
more complex but also
worth consideration.
Suppose in the above
example, before the elder
dies, the investor, who has a
basis already in the policy of
$500,000, finds someone
else who is willing to pay
18

$800,000 for the policy. The
sale is consummated, and
the original investor now
has taxable income of
$300,000 ($800,000 of
proceeds less $500,000 of
basis). This would appear to
be a capital gain, being a
return from the sale of an
investment. By parallel, the
same argument is made
that, upon death, the policy
ends with a “sale” of the
policy to the original
insurance company for
$1,000,000, hence a capital
gain of $500,000.
The capital gains
treatment of the insurance
proceeds that are more than
the investor’s basis
increases the return of the
investor, if this case is
treated statically. However,
changing the after tax
return to the investor would
allow other investors to
compete for the policy at a
lower cost. Thus if the
investor were originally
seeking an after tax 10.80
percent return, as in this
example, then the change in
tax treatment would enable
the investor to earn this
return with an increased
offer to the insured/
policyholder. Solving for the
investment that would
result in an after-tax rate of
return of 10.80 percent
given capital gains
treatment, the investor will
make an offer price of
$554,000, a 10.8 percent
increase, freeing funding
that previously paid for
taxes into direct funding to
the insured, who receives it
on a tax-free basis.8
Alternatively, capital
gains treatment may still be
available to some investors
in some circumstances even
if ordinary tax treatment
holds. An actual resale of a
Summer 2009

life settlement by one
investor to another in a
tertiary market for already
vetted and packaged life
settlements would generate
capital gains to the original
investor.9

The Case for
Alternative Tax
Approaches

Challenges are present
in the legal interpretation
concerning applicable
taxation of life settlement
investment gains. Taxing
the investor’s gain as
ordinary income or capital
gains, as previously
described, changes the tax
character of the original life
insurance transaction. The
twin challenges offered
advance alternative
positions that such gains
are not to be taxed at all,
being instead either a)
subrogation recoveries or b)
assignment proceeds.
Subrogation is defined
as follows:
The substitution of
one person in place
of another with
reference to a lawful
claim… so that he
who is substituted
succeeds to the
rights of the other
(Black’s Law
Dictionary, 4th
edition, 1995).
The substitution of
one for another as a
creditor so that the
new creditor
succeeds to the
former’s rights
(Webster’s, 1967:
876).
Subrogation arises
when one individual
Southern Business Review

Innovation and the Path Not Traveled
William Townsend
The search for metrics to
accurately and comprehensively evaluate the value
of innovation has occupied
researchers and managers
since Schumpeter (1934)
identified it as an engine of
organizational growth. The
ability to quantify this value
was limited for decades to
direct monetary values
(profit increases or cost
reductions) and those
related to R&D (R&D
expenditures, R&D assets,
patents, copyrights, etc.).
While the limitations of
these metrics were well
known, the alternatives were
limited. As a greater body of
theoretical and empirical
research developed on the
impacts of innovation on the
firm, a focused search began
for an understanding of the
underlying mechanisms and
way to measure them in the
organization. This exploration led to an understanding
that innovation’s value to an
organization manifested
itself in different ways.
Observational and
theoretical work identified
several classes of innovation
in organization that all

William Townsend, Ph.D., is a
visiting assistant professor of
management in the Davis
College of Business,
Jacksonville University,
Jacksonville, Florida 32211.

Southern Business Review

produced value. Empirical
research found that the
value of innovation varied
based upon other contextual
criteria, such as industry
sector, markets, customer
relationship and previous
performance.
As the understanding of
the relationship between
innovation and value evolves
to a more contextually
driven model, so too do the
metrics used to capture it.
The understanding of the
range of value that
innovation provides to the
firm and increasingly
sophisticated ways to
capture it is progressively
greater. The strict reliance
upon cost reduction and
R&D related metrics as the
sole evaluative techniques
has past. Empirical research
confirms this gap between
the aggregate value of
innovation and the value
assessed through traditional
measurement. MonteiroBarata (2005) reports an
often-discovered statistic in
the analysis of innovating
firms from two surveys of
Portuguese manufacturing
firms. While both the
INDINOVA and SOTIP
innovation research projects
identified that only a
fraction of the firms
generating product and
process innovation engaged
in R&D. While the
percentage of firms
producing innovations were
fairly consistent between
these studies (36% process
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innovation and 27% product
innovation for the
INDINOVA project, and 25.2
percent process innovation
and 20.7% product innovation for the SOTIP project)
the number of companies
engaged in internal R&D
activities is 3.1 percent
according to the SOTIP
survey (p.305).

Models of Innovation
Valuation

Innovation is a localized
phenomenon, defined within
very specific contextual
boundaries in an
organization. Innovation
valuation models do not
necessarily transfer outside
of the context in which they
are found. This makes it
difficult to establish a
generalizable framework
that can be abstracted and
applied to other environments. An interesting
statistic reported by Hipp
and Grupp (2005) from the
1999 Mannheim Innovation
Panel of German firms,
reflects the localized nature
of much innovation. Of the
1405 firms reporting an
innovation in the past three
years, 34 percent of
manufacturing firms
launched innovations that
were new to the market and
57 percent produced
innovations that were only
new to the firm. This
disparity in the level of
novelty was even more
pronounced in the services
sectors. From the 1080
23

services sector firms with an
innovation in the past three
years, 16 percent created an
innovation new to the
market, while 77 percent
produced an innovation new
to the firm. (p.525)
Pavitt’s (1984) work
studying the sources of
2000 British technological
innovations during the time
period 1945-1980 revealed
that an organization’s
industrial sector was a
significant determinant in
the type of innovations that
a firm pursued. Firms in
industries that were
strongly customer-centric
realized more new product
or service based innovation,
while firms in more
production intensive sectors
increased cost cutting
process related technological innovation.
While this reinforces the
idea that there is no single
set of innovation measurement metrics that can be
applied to all firms, it may
be related to an underlying
flaw in managing the
application of the metrics.
The sectoral variance in
capturing different classes
of innovation may be caused
by only applying those
metrics that have direct
relevance to a current
operational strategy.
The results developed by
Pavitt (1984) may be caused
by the decisions made on
which innovation
measurement metrics to
use, rather than the overall
potential value to the firm.
It’s like the joke about the
man looking for his lost
keys under a streetlight one
night. When a passerby
offers to help in his search,
he asks, “Where do you
think you dropped them?”
The man responds “About
24

100 meters down the
street.” “Then why are we
looking here?” the passerby
asks. The man responds,
“Because the light is better
here.” As managers, we seek
out innovation where the
light is better.

Innovation and the
Value of Failure

The concept of failure
has several connotations in
the context of innovation
value measurement.
Failures in adequately
capturing the value of the
innovation by due to
inadequate or incomplete
application of the valuation
metrics abound. Chesbrough (2004) discussed the
need to measure and
manage “false negatives” in
the innovation process. He
discusses “false negatives”
as innovation efforts that
have been terminated or
abandoned by an
organization which later
show renewed value. The
termination may be because
the innovation relates to
markets outside of those
that the organization
currently pursues. It may be
because the innovation
relates to a market that is
currently undeveloped. In
both cases, the organization
finds renewed value in the
“false negative” at a later
point in time. Chesbrough
highlights the need to
regularly revisit the
knowledge base created by
terminated innovation to
reevaluate the internal and
external value of these ideas
and to develop strategies to
capitalize upon them.
Another implication to
innovation measurement
can be drawn from this
work. By discussing the
Summer 2009

nature of error in valuation
metrics for innovation and
the need to revisit these
evaluations, Chesbrough
highlights the fact that
almost all valuation metrics
for innovation are static
measures. The value of an
innovation is made based
upon an assessment at a
specific point in time. This
point in time assumes that
an organization’s markets,
structure and strategies are
parametric. The possibility,
even probability that these
circumstances will change
over time is obvious.
Labeling an innovation as a
failure and discarding it
from our organizational
knowledge base precludes
any possibility of reaping
value from its application in
another day.
Another type of failure in
innovation valuation is the
failure to use appropriate
measures that capture all
aspects of value to the firm.
The literature on the social
shaping of technology
addresses technological
innovation from a
sociological standpoint as
being generated and shaped
by competing interest
groups. These interest
groups each have a vision of
the potential of a technology
and vie for the resources
and acknowledgment of
their point of view. Pinch &
Bijker (1984) or MacKenzie
& Wajcman (1999) are
examples of a literature that
accents these dynamics in
the selection and implementation of innovations.
The significance of this
theory is twofold. First, that
it identifies that users
appropriate technology and
use it in way unforeseen by
the inventor and second,

Southern Business Review

allowing conversion of
ordinary income into capital
gains.
On the basis of these
two legal cases, typical life
settlements, such as the
example, would have the
following tax result. The
$1,000,000 proceeds less
the basis, or cost, of the
policy of $500,000 is
ordinary income of
$500,000 to the investor
(see Figure 3). The $500,000
could represent interest
from the investment in the
policy; hence, there would
be ordinary income tax
treatment.

transferred several policies
worth a total of $250,000 in
face amount with an
accumulated premium cost
of around $121,000 and a
cash surrender value of
$159,000 to the corporation
in which he was CEO. He
claimed a capital gain of
$38,000. Both the Tax
Court and the Appeals
Court ruled this $38,000
was ordinary income, since
it represented the
accumulated of deferred
interest income, the excess
of cash surrender value over
premium cost. To allow
capital gains treatment
would have been effectively

Or Is It?
First, Section 101(a) (2)
defines the “transfer for
valuable consideration” as
merely giving rise to income,
not whether it is ordinary
income, capital gain, or nontaxable income. In an article
by Magner and Leimberg
(2006), some life settlement
companies specifically
market their products with
the statement “…amounts
received in excess of cash
surrender value are
generally taxable as capital
gain…” along with the words
following that

Figure 3
Comparison of After-tax Returns to Life Settlement Investor
For Survival Periods from One to Seven Years
Face Amount of Policy
Closing Costs
Price Paid in Life Settlement
Annual Premium
Life Expectancy (“Max")
Ordinary Tax Rate to Investor
Capital Gains Tax Rate to Investor

$1,000,000
$75,000
$500,000
$7,000
5 years
33%
15%

12 0 .00 %
11 0 .00 %
10 0 .00 %
9 0 .00 %
8 0 .00 %
7 0 .00 %
6 0 .00 %
5 0 .00 %
4 0 .00 %
3 0 .00 %
2 0 .00 %
1 0 .00 %
0 .00 %
Ord i n ar y Tax Tr ea tm en t
Ca p ita l Ga in s Ta x Tre a tm e n t
Su bro g a ti o n / As s ig n m en t Ta x
Tre a tme n t
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1

2

3

4

5

6

7

70 .7 5%

3 0 .3 1 %

18 .9 8%

1 3 .8 4 %

1 0 .8 0 %

8 .81 %

7.4 0 %

89 .7 6%

3 7 .3 2 %

23 .2 4%

1 6 .8 1 %

1 3 .0 9 %

10 .6 6%

9.0 9 %

1 0 5 .6 0 %

4 2 .9 0 %

26 .5 8%

1 9 .1 3 %

1 4 .8 7 %

12 .1 0%

1 0 .1 5 %
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Figure 2
Comparison of Return to Insured/Heirs from Life Insurance vs. Life Settlement for
Survival Periods of One to Seven Years
Assumptions:
Face Amount of Policy
Price Paid in Life Settlement
Closing Costs
Annual Premium on Life Insurance
Total Premiums Previously Paid at Time 0
Years of Premiums Previously Paid at Time 0

12.00%

11.03%

10 .40%

9.82%

10.00%
8.00%

$1,000,000
$500,000
$75,000
$7,000
$175,000
25 years

9.29%

8.80%

8.35% 7.93%

6.2 9%

6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
1

2

3

4

Return from Life Settl ement

insured’s receipts include
escrow for future premiums,
compensation to the broker,
and payment for closing
costs and profit of the life
settlement company. When
the elderly woman then
dies, the investor receives
$1,000,000 in cash. The
difference between the
investor’s proceeds of
$1,000,000 and his basis or
cost in the asset of
$500,000 is realized gain of
$500,000.7
How Should this Realized
Gain Be Taxed?
The Research Institute
of America’s Federal Tax
Coordinator states, “Any
16

5

6

7

Return from Life Insurance

taxable gain on the sale or
surrender of a life insurance
contract is treated as
ordinary income…”
(Research Institute of
America 2006 Para J-5307).
The basis of this statement
is the interpretation of a
number of cases, including
Estate of Rath v. U.S. (1979)
and Gallun v. Commissioner
(1964). In Estate of Rath v.
U.S. (1979), Rath’s wife
purchased for around
$11,000 the life insurance
policy from her husband’s
corporation on her
husband’s life. A few years
later, her husband died. The
IRS assessed a tax on the
difference between the life
Summer 2009

insurance proceeds of about
$100,000 and the basis of
$11,000 that Mrs. Rath had
paid for the policy. The
Sixth Circuit Court upheld
the treatment of ordinary
income to Mrs. Rath of
about $89,000, saying such
treatment was consistent
with Section 101 (a) (2) of
the Internal Revenue Code,
which covers transfer for
valuable consideration. One
issue is not that the Sixth
Circuit found the amount of
$89,000 to be taxable, but
that it was labeled as
ordinary income and not
capital gain.
In Gallun v. Commissioner (1964), the taxpayer
Southern Business Review

that an innovation’s value is
determined by a user group
who has a vision of what it
can do for them.
When we relate these
societal perspectives to an
organization, the contextual
nature of innovation’s utility
becomes clear. Those who
bring the innovation to the
specific organizational
context are primarily
responsible for determining
and advocating the value
metrics for its efficacy.
While the originating
organization may not find
value, the circumstances
existing in another
organization may find
immediate value. Independent of its intended
application or original value
measurement, it is the
evaluative framework that a
champion or user group
applies to the idea from
within their own context
that proves determinant.
This not only confirms the
distinct nature of the
valuation configuration
between firms, but also that
the valuation configuration
within a firm may vary over
time, group dynamics and
other circumstances.
The bias toward
establishing innovation
valuation metrics that
directly relate to the current
product offering
configuration, markets and
processes leads to a skewed
view of the content that
passes through these filters.
Innovations that relate to
the current context find
higher valuation than those
that do not because of the
relevancy to the metrics.
This leads to adaptation of
incremental innovation
because they better relate to
our frame of reference, than
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more disruptive innovation
that does not.
Unfortunately, this
comparison is usually
couched in the rubric of
“valuation” when there is
little actual value
comparison being made.
The true value of a
disruptive innovation that
does not fall within current
plans and strategies is
rarely assessed.
One of the examples
where metrics missed
important value has become
part of our popular culture.
In 1968, 3M researchers
developing adhesives
produced a substance that
due to its molecular
structure would cling to
objects but was too weak for
a permanent bond. Due to
its poor adhesive properties,
the innovation languished.
In the mid 1970s Arthur
Fry, another researcher at
3M, found that if the
adhesive was applied to
paper, it would allow him to
bookmark the pages of his
church hymnal without
staining the page. This new
use allowed for the
application of a different set
of valuation metrics.
Evaluated for its traditional
adhesive characteristics,
this substance would have
been abandoned. In 1980,
3M introduced the Post-It
Note and created a
completely new product
category (Wikipedia, 2009).
We are faced with the
conclusion that innovation
should not be discarded,
since it is inevitable that
they will find value in some
context. The issue for
managerial practitioners is
to find the correct context
through which to capitalize
on this value.

Summer 2009

Failure Has Value

There are a variety of
reasons why an innovative
idea never becomes realized
in the marketplace. There is
innovation that is missed
because an employee never
expresses the idea or shares
his insight. This may be
caused by perceived or
actual penalties associated
with a failure. There is some
evidence that anonymous
methods of contributing
ideas in an organization
may enhance participation
and contribution levels. By
reducing the perceived risk
to participants of offering
ideas that might be seen
negatively, anonymity
increases their willingness
to participate. Valacich et al.
(1994) found that
anonymous submission may
increase the willingness to
participate by reducing the
perceived risk of offering
ideas that might be seen
negatively.
Anecdotal evidence
supports the impact of fault
tolerant environments on
the production of
innovation. In a Forum on
Innovation, conducted by
the U.S. Department of
Commerce (2006), William
Zollars the Chairman of YRC
Worldwide discussed his
firm’s innovation
management policy. YRC
Worldwide, formerly Yellow
Freight, combines a fault
tolerant environment with
strong decentralized
decision-making. This
provides for a more direct
hypothesis-testing context
at the point closest to where
the innovation is generated.
This leads to effective
exploration of the idea and
responsibility for its
evaluation. Not only does
25

YRC Worldwide not punish
failures, but celebrates
them. Zollars elaborates on
an occasion when it was
clear that an innovation
implementation was failing;
…but we did it
anyway, even though
I knew it was going
to be a mess,
because it was more
important for us to
say, ‘Look we’re
trying stuff even
though we’re not
sure its going to be
successful,” than it
was to say, “No,
that’s a stupid idea,
we’re not going to do
it,” (DOC, 2008: 1112).
Creating a failuretolerant environment for
innovation hypothesis
testing and experimentation
does not do as much to
guide the behavior of an
employee with an insight as
it does to remind us that all
ideas have value. This
approach informs us on how
processes that capture value
should be structured. When
we create an internal
climate that encourages
individual creativity and
openness, whom are we
really talking to? The
greatest affect of such an
organizational change may
not be our employees, but
the organization’s culture
and value system. McAdam
and Keogh (2004) find
additional empirical support
for the modification of the
systems of innovation
measurement into more
fault tolerant processes. One
of the benefits they find is in
overcoming past
disillusionment from
26

rejected ideas. When such
approaches are successful is
it because more innovative
ideas are developed and
presented by employees, or
is it because we are
sensitizing ourselves toward
hearing the stream of ideas
already flowing there?
Increases in the innovation
output may be caused more
by changes to the
organizational receiver
rather than the sender.
Failure of the processes
and techniques used within
an organization to resolve
problems may serve as a
significant source of
innovation. Thomas Kuhn
(1962) describes that the
pressure for change in the
prevailing assumptions and
conceptual framework in a
discipline comes from an
increasing accumulation of
anomalies that are
inconsistent with them over
time. Many times the
pressure for change that
generates or brings
innovations to the surface
are generated from a
Kuhnian disfunctionality in
how the current technology
and processes meet the
needs of the specific
circumstances in the
organization. The
organization finds that the
attempt to solve problems
with existing processes and
approaches is less and less
functional. The developing
realization that the current
systems are increasingly
dysfunctional, opens the
organization up to the
possibility of alternative
solutions. It is the energy
behind this increasing level
of discomfort that motivates
the search for new and
innovative solutions. This
pressure also focuses the
attention of value measureSummer 2009

ment upon the “goodness of
fit” criteria as a solution to a
specific set of problems.
The results found in the
academic literature of the
1980's and 1990's with
organizational prescriptions
for generating innovation
through the construction of
nurturing and participative
environments to elicit and
develop ideas has been
tepid, at best. On the other
hand, the somewhat
disturbing data from
organizational creativity
studies has found that
many times innovations
from the shop floor find
their birth in anger,
frustration and desperation.
Canner & Mass’ (2005)
contend that innovation is
motivated by desperate acts
needed to keep operations
running rather than by a
creative environment. In this
case, desperation reduces
the risk of having an idea be
perceived negatively. This
motivates the innovator and
makes them more willing to
share their insights. More
significantly, desperation
may change the perspective
of managers making them
more receptive and attentive
to innovative solutions being
presented to them.

Evaluating the
Secondary Effects of
Innovation

The secondary effects of
innovations upon an
organization may be greater
and more profound that
those related to their
immediate application. By
secondary effects, we mean
those impacts that
innovation has upon the
firm that are not directly
related to the immediate
reflection of value in a
Southern Business Review

Panel C
Cash Surrender Value Only Distribution Based upon Investor’s $500,000 Payoff Equivalent

Insured /
Policyholder,
$191,750, 38%

Opport unity Cost,
$300,000, 60%

Taxes, $8, 250, 2%

Note:

Tax is ordinary income tax on the difference between the premiums paid and the cash surrender
value [($200,000-$175,000)*.33]

The taxability of the
$500,000 gain realized by
the investor when he
collects the $1,000,000 face
value upon the death of the
insured is the subject of the
subsequent analyses. To
focus on the primary issue
of this article, the
alternatives all assume that
the transaction would be
tax-free to the insured if she
participates in a life
settlement and to the heirs
if they receive the face value
at the insured’s death.
Federal Tax Ramifications
of a Viatical/life
Settlement Payment
The tax ramifications of
the sale of a life insurance
policy to a life settlement
company and subsequent
sale by the company to an
investor, in most cases, are
more clearly defined,
specifically the tax
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treatment for the terminallyill seller. However, current
ordinary income tax
treatment for the investor is
predicated upon legal
precedent in which a capital
gain argument has
substantial support.
Continuing the previous
example, the return to the
insured seller and her heirs
from the life settlement
represents an immediate
tax-free 6.29 percent
compounded annual return
on premiums paid reflected
in Figure 2. Should the
insured continue the policy
until her death, the return
to her estate, or heirs, is a
function of her survival and
declines from 11.03 percent
with a single year of survival
to 7.93 percent with seven
years of survival. Thus, the
insured has the classic
investment decision of
immediate certain proceeds
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versus a variable future
return. In the absence of life
settlements, the only
alternative that also
provides immediate liquidity
is ending the policy and
receiving the cash surrender
value, as reflected in Panel
C. In this example, life
settlements provide 128
percent more cash
($425,000 versus $191,750)
than the cash surrender
value alternative.
On the other hand,
suppose the woman sells
the $1,000,000 policy to a
life settlement company for
$425,000 net cash, which is
tax-free to her. The life
settlement company then
sells it to an investor(s) for
$500,000, and the investor
can expect to receive
proceeds of $1,000,000 at
the policyholder’s death.
The difference between the
investor’s payment and the

15

Panel A
Terminally- or Chronically-Ill Insured Policy Seller Distribution of Investor’s $500,000 Payoff

Taxes, $ 5,700, 1 %

Escrow, $35,000,
7%
Br oker/Life
Settlemen t
Com pany, $34 ,300,
7%

Insured /
Polic yholder ,
$425, 000, 85%

Note:

Tax is the sum of (a) tax paid by the broker on fee income [($75,000-$35,000)*.50*.25] and (b) tax
paid by the life settlement company on its profits [($75,000-$35,000)*.50*.10*.35]. The assumed tax
rate is the maximum marginal tax rate by tax entity, consistent with other studies and shown to be
reasonable by Jensen, Kaplan and Stiglin, 1989.

Panel B
Senior Citizen Insured Policy Seller Distribution of Investor’s $500,000 Payoff

Taxes, $47,700,
10%

Escrow, $35,000,
7%
Broker/Life
Settlement
Company, $34,300,
7%

Insured /
Policyholder,
$383,000, 76%

Note:

14

Tax is the sum of (a) tax paid by the broker on fee income [($75,000-$35,000)*.50*.25], (b) tax paid
by the life settlement company on its profits [($75,000-$35,000)*.50*.10*.35], (c) tax paid by the
insured on the proceeds over the cash surrender value at the capital gains rate [$425,000$200,000)*.15] and (d) tax paid by the insured on the difference between the premiums paid and the
cash surrender value at the ordinary income rate [($200,000-$175,000)*.33].
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product, process or service.
These may be impacts on
value derived from changes
to the organization, its
structure, culture, markets,
other innovations, and
client or supplier
relationships.
Risk becomes an
important consideration in
the innovation evaluation
process. As the element of
risk becomes a more
significant factor in the
valuation of an innovation,
the precision and likelihood
of an accurate evaluation of
the idea’s benefit to the
organization becomes
smaller. The concept that
increasing uncertainty for
estimates of cost reductions
or profit potential leading to
a lowered expected value
and reduced valuation of the
idea is straightforward.
However, when we turn to
measuring other value
returns on an innovation,
such as the secondary
effects, uncertainty plays a
greater role. An example of a
significant secondary effect
is the value to a firm of
introducing a new product
that gives it “first mover”
status in the marketplace.
While we may accurately
estimate our product sales
in a new market, rarely is
the more significant factor of
the value to the firm of
being able to shape the
market with it innovation
quantified. Indeed, a firm’s
ability to define the
taxonomy and salient
factors of a new market will
generate value to the firm
long after the value of the
specific product being
introduced has passed.
Think of the value generated
for an IBM or Microsoft
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through defining a market
that continued long after
their initial product
introductions had faded
from the marketplace. In
hindsight this value is clear,
yet a priori, it is rarely
included in the valuation of
an innovation. When we are
unable to quantify the
impact due to uncertainty,
we tend to negate it and
ignore it completely.
Unfortunately, ignoring
what we cannot quantify
leads to the same set of
assumptions as if it had no
value.
Whenever a value
assessment is made outside
of the current context, risk
plays a part in that process.
However, this does not
mean that we discard all
concepts of value that
contain a level of
uncertainty. Risk is
quantified and incorporated
into the value assessment.
These risk quantification
techniques provide a
window into methods that
may be able to more
completely capture the full
value impacts of innovation.
An additional secondary
effect is the chaining effect
that innovation takes. One
idea leading to another. In
and of itself, an innovation
may not prove valuable
enough to pursue. Yet it
may lead to a stream of one
or more related ideas and
innovations, which may
prove valuable. The
potential for this chain of
events may or may not be
apparent at the time an
innovation is evaluated.
Anecdotal evidence of these
events is prevalent, however,
unfortunately only apparent
in retrospect. Such
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examples are strong enough
to inform our actions to not
preclude their possibility.

Preserving the Value
of Innovations Not
Pursued

The body of literature on
innovation measurement
metrics that discusses the
need to align the
measurement and valuation
process with the
organization’s strategy is
extensive (Vossen, 1999;
Neely et al., 2000). While
this approach has value in
the static and immediate
timeframe, it misses a much
more important aspect of
valuation of an innovation
over time. Following this
strategy we can conceive of
innovations being
abandoned for a variety of
reasons bound to the
immediacy of the criteria
that are used to evaluate
them. Innumerable
examples from almost any
firm engaging in R&D in
which important innovations were abandoned
because of a lack of
immediate resource
availability to develop them
exist. This is understandable from an
operational standpoint, but
should this necessarily lead
to an abandonment of the
innovation and the forfeiture
of all the value that it can
produce? In a recent
interview A.G. Lafley, the
CEO of Procter & Gamble
discussed an innovation
that manifested value at a
later point in time and in an
unexpected way;
We invented a
material back in the
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60's that would
absorb a lot of water.
Until we converted it
into a Pampers
disposable baby
diaper, it was just a
new kind of material.
We created this
entirely new product
category, and that
created an industry
(Crockett, 2009:
p.44).
A number of management approaches can be
used to derive and preserve
the value potential. Internal
strategies may find it
beneficial to develop an
innovation at a lower level of
funding, allowing progress
and evolution while
preserving resources.
External strategies may
realize value from external
partnerships or licensing
revenues. Many times
significant innovations that
are not related to current
operational or strategic
plans can find a home in a
spin-off organization or joint
venture. Whether within the
current organizational
structure or outside of it, at
the current point in time or
sometime in the future,
innovation provide real
value that should not be
abandoned.

Conclusion

The establishment of the
value of innovation to a firm
is difficult to quantify. As
our understanding of the
full impacts of innovation on
the firm evolves, the
methods that we use to
capture this value changes.
There are three significant
implications to management
practice from these results.
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1. The measurement tools
that we utilize determine
the innovations that we
select and implement,
not visa versa. When the
only tool that you have
is a hammer, everything
looks like a nail. When
the only innovation
metrics that we use
focus on cost reduction
exclusively, the only
innovations you will
identify are those
incremental and process
innovations that reduce
cost. Care should be
given to the evaluative
techniques implemented
because they will, in
large part, determine the
character of the results.
2. Innovation valuation
metrics must be selected
that take into account
the secondary impacts of
an innovative idea. The
implications of not
pursuing an idea or of
the longer-term value of
an idea must be
measured. These
impacts on value to the
firm may be much
greater in scale than a
static evaluation.
3. Innovation ideas that
the organization decides
not to pursue, for
whatever reason, should
not be abandoned.
Additions to the firm’s
knowledge base may
lead to other synergistic
developments. As
circumstances, markets
and strategies change
over time, the value of
an innovation to a firm
may change dramatically. For this reason,
the knowledge base of
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unimplemented innovations should be
periodically and systematically revisited.
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Basic Example of a
Viatical/life Settlement
Transaction
An elderly, terminally-ill
life insurance policyholder
seeks to sell her $1,000,000
face value death benefit
policy as soon as possible
for as much money as
possible as outlined in
Figure 1. She desires to
obtain cash now while she is
living rather than later for
her estate or heirs upon her
death, and she qualifies for
tax-free treatment of her
proceeds. The insured has
paid total premiums of
$175,000 over the life of the
policy so far, and the cash
surrender value is
$200,000. The policyholder
has a life expectancy of
three years, but some
potential for survival to five
years. The investor
conservatively bases his
offer on the outside time of
five years.
In this case, the investor
offers $500,000 to the

policyholder in order to
become the new owner of
the policy and name himself
the new beneficiary. Closing
costs of $75,000 cover the
commission for the
insurance broker, due
diligence of the life
settlement company, five
years of future premiums,
and overhead and profit of
the life settlement company.
Assuming the policy is paid
upon death at the end of five
years, the investment will
provide $425,000 to the
insured immediately as
reflected in Panel A and
yield 14.87 percent
compounded annual return
to the investor (for more
information as to how this
compounded annual return
varies by survival period
and tax treatment, see
Figure 3, page 17, which
reflects declining returns for
longer survival periods).
Panel B provides a
comparison of the
distribution of the proceeds

of the life settlement when
the insured/policyholder
does not qualify as
terminally-ill/chronically-ill
and must pay taxes at
receipt of the life settlement
proceeds. Note that current
tax policy offers a $42,000
benefit to the terminally- or
chronically-ill insured seller
over the average senior
citizen insured seller.6
The alternatives reflected
in Panels A and B provide
current liquidity that is
absent if the policy pays the
estate, or heirs, at death.
The alternatives are larger
than the equally liquid cash
surrender value shown in
Panel C. Note that the taxes
at the time of the life
settlement transaction are
solely those paid by the
broker on his fee income
and by the life settlement
income on its earnings.

Figure 1
An Example of Distribution of Life Settlement Investment
Assumptions:
Face Amount of Policy
Premiums Paid
Cash Surrender Value
“Maximum” Life Expectancy
Price Paid in Life Settlement
Closing Costs
Annual Premium on Life Insurance
Broker Commission as % of non-premium closing costs
Life Settlement Company Return on Closing Costs
Ordinary Income Tax Rate to Life Settlement Company
Ordinary Income Tax Rate to Broker
Ordinary Income Tax Rate to Insured/Policyholder
Capital Gains Tax Rate to Insured/Policyholder
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$1,000,000
$175,000
$200,000
5 years
$500,000
$75,000
$7,000
50%
10%
35%
25%
33%
15%
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longer the transferor lives
after the transfer.
As these life settlements
have grown over the past
dozen years, the market has
shifted from institutional
investors to include
individual investors as well.
This form of secondary
market for life insurance
policies has risen from $13
billion in face amount of
policies transferred in 1995
to $160 billion in 2004
(Simon and Schmitt 2006).
The current life
settlement market is divided
into the segment for the
terminally-ill insured/
policyholder and the
segment for any life
insurance policy sale by
someone else. While
institutions can participate
directly with an insured,
individual investors typically
use an intermediary to
match potential sellers and
potential investors. The Life
Settlement Association
(2007), a trade association
for companies involved in
viatical and life settlements,
has members from 58
brokers who negotiate sales
on behalf of sellers spread
across 48 states plus the
District of Columbia. On
average there are 11
licensed brokers who are
members of the Life
Settlement Association in
each state.
Life settlement
companies provide the
services that coordinate the
sale and investment. The
due diligence and the
paperwork in the public
offering of life settlements
are substantial. The life
settlement company verifies
information about life
expectancy of the insured
and obtains authorization
from beneficiaries. Several
12

individual investors may
participate in ownership of a
single life insurance policy,
and each individual investor
may purchase an interest in
several life insurance
policies. The life settlement
company manages the
payment of subsequent
premiums through an
escrow account, tracks
notification of deaths, and
receives and distributes the
life insurance proceeds.
They have a dual marketing
role in both establishing
contacts with those
interested in receiving
accelerated death benefits
and identifying appropriate
investors. The closing costs,
including the due diligence,
prepayment of premiums for
a projected period and
commissions to brokers,
usually amount to ten to
fifteen percent of the
investment/purchase price
of the insurance policy.
These closing costs are
typically paid by the insured
from his or her proceeds
and do not affect the return
to investors.2
All parties to the sale are
considered to benefit.3 The
original policyholder is able
to sell his policy for an
amount substantially
greater than the cash
surrender value typically
found in whole life policies,
and the investor is able to
achieve a corresponding
return on this life settlement
contract while avoiding most
of the risks associated with
the equity markets and far
exceeding the current
market rate of a low risk
bond. The investor retains
the uncertainties of when
the policy will mature since
it depends on when the
insured dies, and the
possible payment of
Summer 2009

additional premiums if the
insured lives beyond the
projected period. Within
these investment parameters, the risks for the
investor are generally
diversified by the investor
purchasing an ownership
interest in several policies of
various insured persons.
Prior to the emergence of
the life settlement industry,
taxation of life insurance
proceeds was well defined.
When an individual dies,
Section 101 of the Internal
Revenue Code classifies the
life insurance proceeds as
generally free of federal
income taxation to the
beneficiary.4 Terminally-ill
individuals frequently sold
their policies in the 1980's
and 1990's, precipitated
principally by a rise in
terminally-ill AIDS patients.
Section 101(g)(1)(A) and
7702B of the Internal
Revenue Code were added
by the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and
clarified that proceeds from
the sale of a life insurance
policy to a life settlement
company are a tax-free
death benefit to the
terminally-ill patient (Raby
and Raby 2000). 5
The taxation of the
eventual proceeds of life
policies to investors has not
been directly addressed in
the tax code. The current
tax treatment is based upon
precedent from court cases
for ordinary income tax
treatment of the life
settlement proceeds to the
investor. The following
example assumes the taxfree treatment of proceeds to
the insured seller and
ordinary income tax
treatment for the proceeds
to the investor.
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